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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the House GOP tax reform blueprint, 
which would significantly reduce marginal tax rates, increase 
standard deduction amounts, repeal personal exemptions and most 
itemized deductions, and convert business taxation into a destination-
based cash flow consumption tax.  Taxes would drop at all income 
levels in 2017, but the highest-income households would gain the most.  
Federal revenues would fall by $3.1 trillion over the first decade 
(static) and $3.0 trillion after accounting for macroeconomic feedback 
effects.  Including added interest costs, the federal debt would rise by 
at least $3.6 trillion over the first decade and by as much as $9.2 
trillion by the end of the second ten years.   
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House Speaker Paul Ryan announced on June 24, 2016 the 
House GOP blueprint for broad income tax reform.  The proposal 
would reduce tax rates, simplify many provisions, and convert the 
taxation of business income into a destination-based cash-flow 
consumption tax.1  Many important details are not specified in the 
blueprint.  We needed to make assumptions about these unspecified 
details for our analysis (see Appendix A).  In addition, Speaker Ryan’s 
staff says the plan will be adjusted if necessary to offset any net 
revenue loss attributable to the tax provisions including 
macroeconomic feedback effects and excluding the effect of repealing 
the taxes enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act.2 
The Tax Policy Center (TPC) has estimated the revenue cost 
and the distributional effects of a plan consistent with the House GOP 
blueprint.  We estimate that a plan such as this would reduce federal 
revenue by $3.1 trillion over the first decade of implementation and by 
an additional $2.2 trillion in the second decade, before accounting for 
added interest costs or considering macroeconomic feedback effects.3  
Most of the revenue loss arises from business tax cuts.    
TPC, in collaboration with the Penn-Wharton Budget Model 
(PWBM), also prepared two sets of estimates of the House GOP plan 
                                                      
1 Paul Ryan, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, GOP 
TAX REFORM TASK FORCE (June 24, 2016), 
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf 
[perma.cc/G6B3-YMT3].   
2 That is, the net revenue loss estimated by dynamic scoring could be as 
great as $0.8 trillion over the first decade and $1.4 trillion over the second.  Ryan 
argues that the revenue loss from the ACA taxes should be offset “by repealing the 
massive new entitlement program created by Obamacare.” supra note 1 at 16.  It is 
unclear what the replacement for ACA would be and we did not consider changes 
in health care outlays—including the refundable premium tax credit—in our 
analysis. 
3 These estimates account for many microeconomic behavioral responses, 
such as reduced use of tax preferences and increased capital gains realizations 
when marginal tax rates on income and capital gains decline.  The methodology we 
follow in preparing these estimates follows the conventional approach used by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to estimate 
revenue effects before considering the macroeconomic effects.  As noted in the 
text, we do not model certain potentially large tax avoidance responses because of 
uncertainty about exactly how the proposal would be implemented. 
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that take into account macroeconomic feedback effects.4  Both sets of 
estimates indicate that the plan would boost GDP in the short run, 
reducing the revenue cost of the plan.  However, longer-run estimates 
indicate that over time the effect on output would become negative, 
increasing the revenue cost of the plan.  Including macroeconomic 
feedbacks, the revenue loss falls to $3.0 trillion over the first decade, 
but rises to $3.4 trillion over the second decade.  Including interest 
costs, the federal debt would increase by $3.6 trillion by 2026 and by 
$9.2 trillion by 2036.  Eventually, rising debt pushes up interest rates, 
which crowds out private investment and slows growth.  By 2036, the 
PWBM estimates that GDP would be 2.6 percent lower than if the tax 
cuts had not been enacted.  These estimates are sensitive to parameter 
assumptions and the effects on GDP could be larger or smaller in both 
the short- and the long-run. 
The plan would cut taxes at every income level in 2017, but 
high-income taxpayers would receive the biggest cuts, both in dollar 
terms and as a percentage of income.  Overall, the plan would cut the 
average tax bill in 2017 by $1,810, increasing after-tax income by 2.5 
percent.  Three-quarters of the tax cuts would benefit the top 1 percent 
of households.  The average tax cut for the highest-income 0.1 percent 
(incomes over $3.7 million in 2015 dollars) would be about $1.3 
million, 16.9 percent of after-tax income.  Households in the middle 
fifth of the income distribution would receive an average tax cut of 
almost $260, or 0.5 percent of after-tax income, while the poorest fifth 
of households would see their taxes go down an average of about $50, 
or 0.4 percent of their after-tax income.  By 2025, households in some 
upper-middle income groups would have tax increases (although staff 
report that the plan will be adjusted so that no income group would 
experience an overall tax increase).  The average tax cut at other 
income levels would be smaller in 2025, relative to after-tax income, 
than in 2017. 
The plan would reduce the top individual income tax rate to 33 
percent from the current 39.6 percent, reduce the corporate rate from 
35 to 20 percent, and cap at 25 percent the tax rate on profits of pass-
through businesses (such as sole proprietorships and partnerships), 
which are taxed under the individual income tax.  Individuals could 
                                                      
4 See Benjamin R. Page & Kent Smetters, Dynamic Scoring of Tax Plans, 
TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/2000921-Dynamic-Scoring-of-Tax-Plans.pdf [perma.cc/3ZG2-PLXT] for a 
description of the macroeconomic models used in TPC’s analysis. 




deduct half of their capital gains, dividends, and interest, reducing the 
top effective rate on such income to 16.5 percent.   
The plan would increase the standard deduction and child tax 
credit.  It would repeal personal exemptions and all itemized 
deductions except those for charitable contributions and home 
mortgage interest.  The plan would also eliminate the alternative 
minimum tax (AMT), estate and gift taxes, and all taxes associated 
with the Affordable Care Act (ACA).   
The corporate income tax would be replaced by a cash-flow 
consumption tax that would apply to all businesses: investments would 
be immediately deducted (i.e., expensed) and interest would no longer 
be deductible.  The cash flow tax would be border adjustable, meaning 
receipts from exports would be excluded and purchases of imports 
would not be deductible.  The plan would move the U.S. tax system to 
a destination-based system in which all sales to U.S. consumers would 
be taxable, regardless of their source, and all sales to foreign 
consumers would be exempt from U.S. tax. 
The marginal tax rate cuts would boost incentives to work, 
save, and invest if interest rates do not change.  The plan would reduce 
the marginal effective tax rate on most new investments, which would 
increase the incentive for investment in the U.S. and reduce tax 
distortions in the allocation of capital.  In the short run, increased 
investment would raise labor productivity and U.S. wages by 
increasing capital per worker.  However, increased government 
borrowing would push up interest rates and crowd out private 
investment, eventually offsetting the plan’s positive effects on private 
investment unless federal spending was sharply reduced to offset the 
effect of the tax cuts on the deficit.  If the plan is modified to reduce 
the overall revenue loss, the adverse effects of rising interest rates 
could moderate or be eliminated.  Those unspecified modifications 
could also, of course, modify economic incentives. 
II. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 
A. Individual Income Tax 
The House GOP tax plan would consolidate the regular 
standard deduction, additional standard deductions for age or 
blindness, and the personal exemption for tax filers into new standard 
deduction amounts of $12,000 for single filers, $18,000 for head of 
household filers, and $24,000 for joint filers. 
The plan would reduce the number of individual income tax 
brackets from the current seven brackets to three—12, 25, and 33 
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percent—cutting the top 39.6 percent rate by 6.6 percentage points 
(Table 1).   
 
The plan would replace the special rates on capital gains and 
dividends with a 50 percent deduction, which would also apply to 
interest income.  The top rate on capital gains and dividends would be 
reduced from 23.8 percent (including the 3.8 percent surtax on net 
investment income) to 16.5 percent, a decrease of over 30 percent.  The 
top rate on interest income would be reduced from 43.4 percent to 16.5 
percent, a decrease of over 60 percent. 
The plan would repeal the deduction for personal exemptions 
for children and other dependents, which in 2016 is $4,050 and 
indexed for inflation.  In its place, the plan would increase the child 
tax credit from $1,000 to $1,500 and create a new nonrefundable credit 
of $500 for other dependents.  The child tax credit would phase out 
beginning at $75,000 of adjusted gross income for single filers (as 




under current law) and $150,000 for joint filers (an increase from 
$110,000 under current law).5 
The plan would eliminate all itemized deductions except the 
deductions for mortgage interest and charitable contributions.  The 
plan would, nonetheless, reduce or eliminate tax savings from the 
remaining deductions for many taxpayers for three reasons.  First, 
eliminating most itemized deductions and increasing the standard 
deduction would significantly reduce the number of taxpayers who 
itemize.6  We estimate that 38 million (84 percent) of the 45 million 
filers who would otherwise itemize in 2017 would opt for the standard 
deduction.  Nonitemizers obviously do not benefit from itemized 
deductions.  Second, for many who continue itemizing, the fraction of 
their mortgage interest or charitable contributions that exceeded the 
standard deduction (that is, reduces taxable income) would decline.7  
Third, many would face lower marginal tax rates, which would reduce 
the value of any deduction. 
                                                      
5 The plan does not specify whether these credits would be indexed for 
inflation (the current child tax credit is not), whether the phase-out ranges for the 
child tax credit would be indexed for inflation (they are not indexed under current 
law), or whether the new $500 credit for other dependents would be subject to an 
income phase out (personal exemptions are phased out at higher income levels 
under current law).  Speaker Ryan’s staff did not respond to our request for 
clarification on these issues.  For our analysis we have assumed that neither credit 
is indexed for inflation, that the new credit for other dependents phases out in the 
same manner as the child tax credit, and that the phase-out ranges are not indexed 
for inflation. 
6 For our analysis we have assumed that the plan repeals the limitation on 
itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers, although Speaker Ryan’s staff did 
not provide clarification on this issue. 
7 The effective subsidy rate for an itemized deduction is the marginal tax 
rate multiplied by the fraction of the deduction in excess of the standard deduction.  
Thus, for example, if a taxpayer in the 25 percent tax bracket has $10,000 of 
mortgage interest, but total itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction by 
$5,000, the effective subsidy rate is 12.5 percent (5,000/10,000*25 percent).  Since 
the plan eliminates some large itemized deductions, such as the deduction for state 
and local taxes, and raises the standard deduction, the fraction of itemized 
deductions in excess of the standard deduction will decline. 
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The plan would repeal the individual AMT and a number of 
“special interest” tax provisions, only some of which were explicitly 
identified and included in our estimates.8 
B. Estate and Gift Taxes 
The House GOP tax plan would eliminate the federal estate, 
gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes.9 
Eliminating the estate tax would remove several economic 
distortions (such as the incentive it creates to spend down asset 
balances to below the threshold for taxation).  However, eliminating 
the estate tax would also remove the incentive it provides the wealthy 
to make charitable contributions.10  
C. Business Taxes 
The House GOP tax plan would cut the top corporate tax rate 
from 35 percent to 20 percent.  A top rate of 25 percent would apply 
to pass-through entities such as sole proprietorships, partnerships and 
S corporations, which are taxed at individual rates of up to 39.6 percent 
under current law.11  
The 8 percentage point differential between the top rate on 
pass-through business income and wages could create a strong 
incentive for many wage earners to form a pass-through entity that 
provides labor services to their current employer instead of taking 
                                                      
8 Because Speaker Ryan’s staff did not respond to our request for 
clarification on the specific provisions that would be repealed under the plan, our 
revenue and distributional estimates only include repeal of the “special interest” 
provisions explicitly identified in the plan description.  However, we do show as an 
addendum to our revenue estimates (Table 2) the revenue effect of repealing the 
other “special interest” provisions listed in Appendix A. 
9 The plan does not specify whether the basis of inter vivos gifts would 
continue to carry over from the transferor (carryover basis), or whether the basis of 
assets transferred at death would continue to be stepped up (stepped-up basis), as 
under current law, or whether limits would apply to the amount of stepped-up basis 
with carryover basis applying to the remainder, as under the law in effect in 2010 
(when the estate tax was temporarily repealed).  For our analysis, we have assumed 
that carryover basis would continue to apply to inter vivos gifts, and that the 2010 
limitation on stepped-up basis would apply. 
10 Repealing the estate tax would also reduce an individual’s incentive to 
make donations during his or her lifetime.  Under current law, such donations 
produce an income tax deduction and reduce the size of the taxable estate, thereby 
saving both income and estate taxes.  Overall, for wealthy individuals the plan 
would substantially increase the tax price of donating, which would tend to reduce 
charitable giving.  However, the large tax cuts for high-income households 
discussed later would produce a partially offsetting income or wealth effect 
because giving tends to rise with income, all else being equal.   
11 Certain income of pass-through entities is also subject to the 3.8 percent 
rate on net investment income, making the top rate 43.4 percent. 




compensation in the form of wages.  To stem such tax avoidance, the 
plan would require pass-through businesses to pay “reasonable 
compensation” for tax purposes, so that the preferential 25 percent rate 
would not apply to all income of pass-through owner-operators.  The 
plan does not specify how reasonable compensation would be defined 
or the rule enforced.  Current-law rules are very difficult to enforce, 
leading to significant tax avoidance; with the much larger rate 
differential under the House GOP plan avoidance would be much more 
prevalent. 12   Nevertheless, for purposes of our analysis we have 
assumed that reasonable compensation would be defined in an 
enforceable manner and would not permit a shift from reported wages 
to business income.  With imperfect enforcement, the plan would lose 
substantially more revenue than we estimate.   
Both corporations and pass-through businesses would be 
permitted to expense (i.e., immediately deduct) all investments in 
equipment, structures, and inventories, rather than having to capitalize 
and depreciate these purchases over time as current law generally 
requires.  In addition, businesses’ net interest expense would no longer 
be deductible, but any unused net interest expense could be carried 
forward indefinitely.  These rules would transform the corporate 
income tax and the individual income taxation of the profits of pass-
through businesses into a cash-flow tax, treating business income as it 
would be treated under a consumption tax that allows deductibility of 
wages.    
If all business income were taxed at the same rate, the tax 
would be equivalent to a subtraction method value-added tax with an 
offsetting credit—at the same rate—for wages.  If the tax rate were set 
at the top individual income tax rate (33 percent in the proposal) and 
individual taxes on capital income were eliminated, the proposal 
would be equivalent to Bradford’s X-tax, a progressive variant of a 
consumption tax.13  The fact that there are two business tax rates, both 
                                                      
12 Under current law, for high earners any income earned through a pass-
through entity that is not subject to payroll tax can reduce the rate on that income 
by as much as 3.8 percent.  Under the House GOP tax plan, any portion of current 
wages that could avoid payroll tax would save 2.9 percent, and if not part of 
“reasonable compensation” another 8 percent (the difference between the 33 
percent top ordinary income tax rate and the 25 percent pass-through tax rate), for a 
total of 10.9 percent.  Shifted earnings below the Social Security maximum 
($127,200 in 2017) would also avoid the 12.4 percent OASDI tax. 
13 Robert Carroll, Alan D. Viard & Scott Ganz, The X Tax: The 
Progressive Consumption Tax America Needs? AEI (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20081217_No423752TPOg.pdf 
[perma.cc/DH32-VCHF].   
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below the top individual income tax rate, create numerous 
complications, including the incentive for income shifting already 
discussed.   
The proposal includes a “border adjustment,” which is 
intended to make the business income tax apply only to domestically 
consumed goods and services, regardless of where they are produced.  
Businesses would be permitted to exclude receipts from exports, and 
imports would not be deductible.  To make the border adjustment 
completely neutral, taxpayers with negative taxable cash flow—which 
would include many or most exporters—would receive any negative 
tax liability as a refund.  The refunds could be large.  The dual business 
rate system also would mean that exporters would have a strong 
incentive to be structured as pass-throughs rather than corporations 
(since the refunds would be larger at a 25 percent rate than at 20 
percent).14  Importers would be more likely to incorporate than under 
current law, although the proposal could still penalize corporations 
relative to pass-throughs because dividends and capital gains would 
continue to be taxed at the individual level.15 
If there is no change in the balance of trade, the border 
adjustment would increase revenues because U.S. imports (which 
would become taxable) exceed U.S. exports (which would become tax-
exempt).  Although it appears unlikely that such a border adjustment 
would be permissible under current international trade law, we have 
nevertheless included the revenue and distributional effects of them in 
                                                      
14 Provisions would need to be made to limit the value of deductions for 
purchases from corporations (which are taxed at 20 percent) by pass-through 
entities that export their products.  This could be extremely complicated.  Other 
countries with border-adjustable tax systems use a credit-invoice VAT, which 
makes rebating taxes paid much simpler.  Exporters simply receive a credit for 
taxes remitted by their suppliers, which are tracked via tax invoices. 
15 Imports direct to consumers would presumably be taxable, although it is 
unclear whether they would be taxed at the 20 percent corporate tax rate or the 25 
percent pass-through rate. 




our estimates.16  Many analysts have noted that this short-run revenue 
source—$1.2 trillion over 10 years by our estimate—is effectively a 
form of borrowing since current trade deficits must eventually be 
offset by trade surpluses.  Moreover, Setser argues that the trade 
surplus may be artificially inflated due to businesses shifting profits 
overseas to avoid U.S. tax and that border adjustments might raise 
substantially less revenue than estimated.17   
Under the plan, the U.S. would no longer tax repatriated profits 
from foreign-source income generated from overseas sales.  The plan 
would make up part of this loss of future revenue by imposing a 
transition tax on the existing unrepatriated earnings of U.S. firms’ 
foreign subsidiaries.  Earnings held in cash would be taxed at 8.75 
percent and other earnings at 3.5 percent, with the liability for this one-
time tax payable over eight years. 
Adopting a destination-based tax system and eliminating 
deductibility of net interest expense would eliminate U.S. 
corporations’ incentives to move their tax residences overseas (i.e., 
“corporate inversions”) and to recharacterize domestic corporate 
income as foreign-source income.  Border adjustability would remove 
these incentives, because the amount of U.S. income tax a corporation 
paid would not depend on where it was incorporated, where its product 
or service was produced, or where its shareholders resided.  However, 
                                                      
16 It appears unlikely that a business cash flow tax could be border 
adjusted under World Trade Organization law.  See Wei Cui, Destination-Based 
Taxation in the House Republican Blueprint, 173 TAX NOTES TODAY 7 (2016); 
Wolfgang Schön, Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law: A Note (Max 
Planck Inst. for Tax L. & Pub. Fin., Working Paper No. 03, 2016).  Note also the 
conclusion of the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: “given 
the uncertainty over whether border adjustments would be allowable under current 
trade rules, and the possibility of challenge from our trading partners, the Panel 
chose not to include any revenue that would be raised through border adjustments”. 
Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-Tax-
System-2005.pdf [perma.cc/V6HP-NXPW] at 172.   
17 For example, under current law, U.S. multinationals have an incentive to 
shift profits to low-taxed foreign subsidiaries by transferring ownership of 
intangible assets to them at low price, so the subsidiaries earn artificially high 
profits.  Those transfers (which are counted as U.S. exports) would become 
nontaxable in the U.S. with the border adjustment, so U.S. multinationals could 
reduce their worldwide tax payments by increasing the value they place on the 
transfers.  U.S. exports would increase, with a corresponding diminution of our 
balance of trade deficit.  Brad Setser, Dark Matter. Soon to be Revealed?, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 2, 2017), http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2017/02/02/dark-
matter-soon-to-be-revealed [perma.cc/VXS3-2WCQ].   
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as noted above, border adjustments are unlikely to be legal under 
existing trade law.  If the plan were adopted without border 
adjustability and with exemption of sales from foreign production, it 
would be a territorial tax and would retain incentives for U.S. 
corporations to shift their profits to low-tax foreign subsidiaries. 
The plan would repeal the corporate AMT and a number of 
“special interest” business tax provisions, only some of which were 
explicitly identified and included in our estimates.18 
D. ACA Taxes 
The House GOP health plan repeals all ACA taxes, including 
the 3.8 percent surtax on net investment income, the 0.9 percent 
additional Medicare rate on high-income workers, excise taxes (for 
example, the excises on medical devices and high-premium health 
insurance), premium credits, and related fees.  We include the repeal 
of ACA taxes in our analysis of the House GOP tax plan.  Note that 
the House GOP health plan also proposes a new limit on the tax 
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance and a new credit for 
non-group health insurance.  We assume that the limit on the tax 
exclusion has the same revenue and distributional effects as the current 
excise tax on high-premium health insurance. 19  In addition, we 
exclude replacement of the ACA premium credit with the proposed 
non-group health insurance credit because we do not include the ACA 
premium credit in our current-law tax baseline.20 
III. IMPACT ON REVENUE AND DISTRIBUTION 
A. Impact on Revenue 
                                                      
18 See supra note 8 for a discussion of special interest provisions. 
19 While an exclusion cap is a more direct and potentially more 
progressive way to reduce the incentive for provision of overly generous health 
insurance, the Cadillac plan tax is so onerous that most employers would reduce 
their spending to below the cap and (eventually) pass on the savings to employees.  
As a result, Blumberg, Holahan, and Mermin (2015) conclude that “the incidence 
of the ACA’s excise tax is identical in most circumstances to a cap on the employer 
exclusion that would raise the same revenue.”  Linda J. Blumberg, John Holahan & 
Gordon Mermin, The ACA’s ‘Cadillac’ Tax Versus a Cap on the Tax Exclusion of 
Employer-Based Health Benefits: Is This a Battle Worth Fighting? URBAN INST.  




20 The ACA premium credit is advanceable and refundable, making it 
more like a spending program than a tax provision.  It is unclear what the 
replacement credit would look like. 




We estimate that the House GOP tax plan would reduce federal 
receipts by $3.1 trillion between 2016 and 2026 before accounting for 
macroeconomic feedback effects (Table 2).21  Nearly two-thirds of the 
revenue loss would come from business tax provisions.  Corporations 
would pay less due because their top rate would be reduced to 20 
percent and the corporate AMT would be repealed.  Pass-through 
businesses taxed under the individual income tax would pay less 
because they would face a 25 percent top rate.  All businesses would 
benefit from expensing of investment, which would be partially offset 
by the disallowance of interest deductibility, repeal of some tax 
expenditures, and, for corporations, the border adjustments and 
transition tax on unrepatriated foreign income.22  
The remainder of the revenue loss would result primarily from 
net cuts in nonbusiness individual income taxes.  Reductions in income 
tax rates, the 50 percent exclusion for capital income, and repeal of the 
ACA taxes and the individual AMT would all reduce revenue.  The 
increased standard deduction amounts, the higher child tax credit, and 
the new credit for other dependents would also reduce revenue, but 
these losses would be more than offset by the repeal of personal 
exemptions and itemized deductions other than those for mortgage 
interest and charitable contributions.   
Repealing the estate and gift taxes and requiring the basis of 
inherited assets to be carried over (as was done in 2010, when the estate 
tax was temporarily repealed), would reduce revenues by $187 billion 
over the budget period.   
We also estimate the effect of the tax changes in the second 
decade (2027–2036) and find the revenue loss ($2.2 trillion) is smaller 
in nominal terms than that in the first 10 years, and also represents a 
smaller share of cumulative gross domestic product (GDP)—0.6 
percent versus 1.3 percent in 2017–2026. 
The House GOP blueprint indicates the plan would repeal 
“special interest” tax provisions, but explicitly identifies only 
employee fringe benefits (other than for health and retirement), the 
domestic production activity deduction, and credits (with several 
                                                      
21 Although we assume an effective date of January 1, 2017, we estimate a 
slight revenue loss in 2016 because taxpayers would postpone realizing capital 
gains in anticipation of the 2017 reduction in capital gains rates.   
22 We report all revenues from the border adjustments as corporate, 
although some portion would be from pass-through entities. 
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exceptions).23  We included only those explicitly identified provisions.  
However, the Addendum to Table 2 shows our estimates of other tax 
provisions the plan might repeal. 
Aside from the unspecified and uncertain provisions, there are 
a number of uncertainties associated with the revenue projection.  As 
noted, House GOP staff argue that repealing the ACA taxes should not 
be considered a revenue loss attributable to tax reform since those will 
be dealt with in health reform legislation.  Subtracting those provisions 
would reduce the revenue loss by $0.8 trillion in the first decade and 
$1.4 trillion in the second.  On the other side, the border adjustments 
will eventually lose revenue, and our estimate of the revenue raised by 
the border adjustments could be too high if the current reported trade 
deficit is artificially inflated by tax-motivated transfer pricing 
strategies.  Finally, conversion of wages and salaries into pass-through 
business income to take advantage of the lower tax rates could result 
in substantial revenue losses.  We have not estimated the revenue loss 
from such shifting in the House GOP plan, but our analysis of the 
Trump plan, which would have taxed pass-through income at 15 
percent (10 percentage points lower than the House plan), estimated 
that income shifting could ultimately cost more revenue than the direct 
effect of cutting pass-through tax rates.  The direct revenue losses 
understate the effect on the national debt because they exclude the 
additional interest that would accrue if debt were to increase.  
Including interest, the proposal would add $3.7 trillion to the national 
debt by 2026 and $8.0 trillion by 2036 (Table 3).  If the tax cuts were 
not offset by spending cuts, we estimate the national debt would rise 
by 13.5 percent of GDP by 2026 and 19.3 percent of GDP by 2036.  
Taking macroeconomic feedback effects into account, the ratio of 
additional debt to GDP would be lower after ten years and larger after 
20 years, rising to at least 13.2 percent by 2026 and to 22.7 percent by 
2036.  The PWBM model estimates that after 2036, revenues and GDP 
fall below the levels estimated without macro feedback by increasing 
amounts, so the ratio of debt to GDP would climb more rapidly in later 
years.   
                                                      
23 The credits identified (directly or by implication) in the House GOP 
blueprint document as retained are the child tax credit, the EITC, education credits, 
the savers’ credit, the research and experimentation credit, and the foreign tax 
credit; all other credits would presumably be repealed. 











B. Impact on Distribution24 
The House GOP tax plan would reduce taxes throughout the 
income distribution in 2017.25 
                                                      
24 This distributional analysis is based on the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model.  For a brief description of the model, see Brief 
Description of the Tax Model, TAX POLICY CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Brief-Description-of-the-Model-
2015.cfm.  [perma.cc/4ABR-E74Q].   
25 Appendix B discusses alternative distribution measures and illustrates 
several alternatives for the House GOP tax plan.   




Taxes would decrease by an average of $1,810, or 2.5 percent 
of after-tax income (Table 4).  On average, households at all income 
levels would receive tax cuts, but the highest-income households 
would receive the largest cuts, both in dollars and as a percentage of 
income.  The top quintile—or top fifth of the distribution—would 
receive an average tax cut of about $11,800 (4.6 percent of after-tax 
income).  Three-quarters of total tax cuts would go to the top 1 percent, 
who would receive an average cut of nearly $213,000, or 13.4 percent 
of after-tax income.  The top 0.1 percent would receive an average tax 
cut of about $1.3 million (16.9 percent of after-tax income).  In 
contrast, the average tax cut for the lowest-income households would 
be just $50, 0.4 percent of after-tax income.  Middle-income 
households would receive an average tax cut of $260, about the same 
relative to after-tax income—0.5 percent—as for the lowest-income 
households.   
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As with the revenue estimates, there are several sources of 
uncertainty associated with the distributional estimates.  In the short-
run, the burden of the net revenue raised by the border adjustments 
depends on how prices adjust.  If exchange rates fully adjust to offset 
the border adjustments, then domestic prices would remain unchanged 
and the net revenue should be distributed similar to a cash flow tax that 
does not burden wage income.  However, if exchange rates do not fully 
adjust, then domestic prices would rise, resulting in a burden more 
similar to that of a broad-based consumption tax.26  An alternative 
approach would attribute zero burden to the border adjustments under 
the view that current trade deficits are temporary and will eventually 
be offset (with interest) by trade surpluses in the future.  Additionally, 
the plan is unclear on many details of the business tax changes, and 
our methodologies differ for distributing changes in existing income 
taxes and consumption-based taxes.  Our analysis distributes the 
changes in business taxes as incremental changes to the income tax 
according to our established methodology,27 but this approach does not 
yield the same result as if the cash flow tax was distributed as a 
replacement for the current income tax on business income.28 
In order to illustrate the uncertainty concerning the short-run 
effects of the plan across the income distribution, we report the percent 
change in after-tax income in 2017 under alternative assumptions 
about the size of the changes in tax burdens due to the business tax 
provisions and the border adjustments, and how those burdens are 
distributed (Table 5).  Overall, under the alternative assumptions the 
                                                      
26 Eric Toder, Jim Nunns & Joseph Rosenberg, Methodology for 
Distributing a VAT, TAX POLICY CTR. (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/1001533-Methodology-for-Distributing-a-VAT.PDF [perma.cc/89GU-JK3D] 
27 Jim Nunns, How TPC Distributes the Corporate Income, TAX POLICY 
CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/how-tpc-distributes-corporate-income-
tax/full [perma.cc/V2XX-VD8D] 
28 Further, by convention, TPC’s distributional analyses do not include 
short-run wealth effects.  In particular, if exchange rates adjust to offset the effect 
of the border adjustments on international trade, the appreciation of the dollar 
would reduce the value of Americans’ foreign asset holdings.  This reduction in the 
value of existing (foreign) assets, which would primarily affect high-income 
households, is not included in the distribution tables.  In addition, replacing the 
corporate income tax with a cash flow consumption tax could reduce the value of 
old capital—another transitory effect; however, we assume that transition rules 
(allowing existing asset holders to continue to deduct unused depreciation and 
interest on outstanding loans) would largely offset this wealth effect.  We are 
reexamining our distributional assumptions and may revise our analysis in a future 
report. 




plan would increase after-tax income in 2017 by between 1.7 and 3.4 
percent.  Households in the bottom four quintiles would see their after-
tax income rise by as much as 1.4 percent.  Households in the 80th to 
95th percentiles would fare the worst.  Higher-income households 
would receive the largest tax cuts.  The top 1 percent would see after-
tax incomes rise by between 8.0 and 14.1 percent, while the richest top 
0.1 percent would receive tax cuts equal to between 10.0 and 17.4 
percent of after-tax income. 
In the longer-run, the burden of the border adjustments would 
not depend on which prices adjust and the distribution of tax changes 
would be similar to the full exchange rate adjustment scenario.  
Although, by 2025, the average tax cut would be smaller and 
households in the 80th to 95th percentiles on average would have tax 
increases rather than cuts.  (Speaker Ryan’s staff have told us that the 
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ultimate proposal will not raise taxes on any income group so 
presumably the plan will be revised to meet this objective.) 
 
IV. DYNAMIC EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY 
In addition to conventional estimates, which are based on fixed 
macroeconomic assumptions, TPC also prepared, in collaboration with 
the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), a set of estimates of the 
House GOP plan that take into account macroeconomic feedback 
effects.  Estimates of the impacts of tax changes on the economy are 
subject to considerable uncertainty and can vary widely depending on 
the models and assumptions chosen.  We present “dynamic” estimates 
from two models to illustrate different ways that tax policy can 
influence the economy.  Estimates using the TPC Keynesian model 
illustrate how the plan’s impact on aggregate demand would influence 
the economy in the short run—that is, over the next few years.  
Estimates using the PWBM illustrate the longer-run impact of the plan 
on potential output through its effects on incentives to work, save, and 
invest, and on the budget deficit.  TPC also plans to build a neoclassical 
model of potential output whose results could be integrated with those 
of the Keynesian model, but that work is still in process. 
A. Impact on Aggregate Demand 
The House GOP tax plan would increase aggregate demand, 
and therefore output, in two main ways.  First, by reducing average tax 
rates for most households, the plan would increase after-tax incomes.  
Households would spend some of that additional income, increasing 
demand.  This effect would be attenuated to some degree because most 
tax reductions would accrue to high-income households, which are 
likely to increase spending proportionately less than would lower-
income households in response to increased after-tax income.  Second, 
the provision allowing businesses to expense investment would create 




an incentive for businesses to raise investment spending, further 
increasing demand.  These effects on aggregate demand would raise 
output relative to its potential level for the next few years, until actions 
by the Federal Reserve and equilibrating forces in the economy 
returned output to its long-run potential level.   
Using the TPC Keynesian model, we estimate that these factors 
would boost output by about 1.0 percent in 2017, by 0.7 percent in 
2018, and by smaller amounts in later years (Table 6).  Using a range 
of assumptions about the response of household spending to changes 
in income, the response of investment to the expensing provision, and 
the impact of increased demand on output, TPC estimates that the 
impact on output could be between 0.2 and 2.3 percent in 2017, 0.1 
and 1.5 percent in 2018, and smaller amounts in later years.   
Those increases in output would boost incomes, which in turn 
would raise tax revenue, offsetting some of the revenue losses from 
the tax plan.  TPC estimates that the plan’s effects on demand would, 
in themselves, boost revenues by $43 billion in 2017 (or between $12 
billion and $129 billion in calendar year 2017 using TPCs full range 
of estimates), by $29 billion (or between $4 and $42 billion) in 2018, 
and by smaller amounts in later years.  The revenue effect of the House 
GOP plan, taking into account the dynamic revenue gains based on the 
TPC Keynesian model using standard parameters, is shown in Table 
2.   
B. Impact on Potential Output 
In addition to short-run effects on aggregate demand, the 
House GOP tax plan would have a lasting effect on potential output—
altering incentives to work, save, and invest—as well as on the budget 
deficit.  Those lasting effects, described below, were estimated using 
the PWBM. 
C. Impact on Saving and Investment 
The House GOP tax plan would alter incentives to save and 
invest in the United States.  Large reductions in the tax rates on 
corporate and pass-through business income, lower effective marginal 
tax rates on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends for most 
taxpayers with such income, and much lower rates on interest income 
throughout the income distribution would all increase the after-tax 
return to savers (Table 7).  Assuming that interest rates do not change 
and that the tax cuts are not eventually financed in ways that reduce 
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incentives to save and invest, these effects, in themselves, would tend 
to increase saving and investment in the U.S. economy.   
 
The overall effect of taxes on incentives to save and invest can 
be summarized in the proposal’s effect on marginal effective tax rates 
(METRs) on new investments.29 METR is a forward-looking measure 
of the tax system’s effect on the rate of return of a hypothetical 
marginal investment project (i.e., one that just breaks even).  We 
compare the METR on different investments under the House GOP tax 
plan with the METR under current law.  Because the plan would allow 
expensing (i.e., immediate deduction) of all investment and would 
reduce average individual-level taxes on interest, capital gains, and 
dividends, METRs for most new business investment would decrease 
significantly (Table 8).  Investments in intellectual property would 
face higher METRs than under current law because business interest 
deductions would be disallowed, but intellectual property would still 
face the lowest METRs of any form of investment because the plan 
                                                      
29 Joseph Rosenberg & Donald Marron, Tax Policy and Investment by 
Startups and Innovative Firms, TAX POLICY CTR. (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/2000103-tax-policy-and-
investments-by-startups-and-innovative-firms.pdf [perma.cc/UMK4-9FWA].   




would retain the research and experimentation credit.  Business 
investments financed by debt would face higher effective tax rates than 
under current law, because the loss of interest deductibility would 
exceed the benefit of expensing.  Overall, the plan would lower 
METRs, making investment more attractive, and would eliminate the 
tax advantage for debt- over equity-financed investments, which could 
reduce corporate leverage.   
Although the House GOP tax plan would improve incentives 
to save and invest, it would also substantially increase budget deficits 
unless offset by spending cuts, resulting in higher interest rates that 
would crowd out investment.  While the plan would initially increase 
investment, rising interest rates would eventually decrease investment 
below baseline levels in later years.    
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D. Impact on Labor Supply 
The House GOP tax plan would reduce effective tax rates on 
labor income (i.e., wages and salaries for employees and self-
employment income for others).  Effective marginal tax rates on labor 
income would be reduced by an average of about 2 percentage points 
and by over 7 percentage points for the top 0.1 percent (Table 9).  In 
combination with increased investment, which raises worker 
productivity and wages, these effects would initially raise labor supply.  
Over time, however, because the plan would eventually reduce 
investment and the capital stock, it would also ultimately depress 








E. Long-Run Impact on Output and Revenues 
The PWBM estimates that the House GOP tax plan’s effects 
on investment and labor supply would boost GDP by 0.9 percent in 
2017, but would reduce GDP by 0.5 percent in 2026 and by 2.6 percent 
in 2036 (Table 6).  Those economic effects would in turn alter 
revenues, increasing them by $49.6 billion in 2017 and by $64.0 billion 
between 2017 and 2026, but reducing them by $1.1 trillion between 
2027 and 2036 (Table 2).  Taking into account the dynamic effects on 
GDP and revenues from the PWBM, the plan would increase debt by 
13.2 percent of GDP by 2026 and by 22.7 percent of GDP by 2036 
(Table 3).  The impact on the ratio of debt to GDP is lower in 2026, 
but higher in 2036, than projected in TPC’s conventional estimates. 
F. Sensitivity of Macro Estimates to Assumptions 
Macroeconomic models are sensitive to assumptions about 
how individuals respond to incentives, the operation of world capital 
markets, and other government policies.  Different types of models 
also can produce very different estimates.  The PWBM allows users to 
see how different assumptions change the model’s estimates.30 For 
example, compared with the baseline before incorporating 
                                                      
30 A user interface to the PWBM is available here: 
http://www.budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/tax-policy-2/ [perma.cc/CCN4-
5M4J].  Users may alter assumptions and see effects on GDP, employment, capital 
stock, etc. 
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macroeconomic response (labeled “pre-policy baseline” in figure 1), 
the PWBM’s baseline estimates (labeled “dynamic”) show GDP rising 
in the short run before eventually returning to the pre-policy level and 
then falling below the pre-policy baseline. 
The best case scenario for a large and sustained supply-side 
response is one in which capital markets are open and U.S. deficits do 
not affect the interest rates facing investors, which are solely 
determined on world markets.31 For the “optimistic” scenario in figure 
1, we assume 100 percent openness and that labor supply and savings 
are very responsive to wages and interest rates (represented by 
elasticities of 1, compared with 0.5 in the baseline).  GDP under this 
set of assumptions rises very quickly to about 1 percent above the pre-
policy level.  The effect is roughly stable over time in percentage 
terms. 
The pessimistic scenario makes the opposite assumptions.  It 
assumes capital markets are closed—i.e., no borrowing abroad—and 
that workers and savers are relatively unresponsive to wages and 
interest rates.  In this scenario, GDP falls below the static level starting 
in 2019.  By 2040, it falls by about 9 percent compared with the level 
in the pre-policy baseline because the government’s borrowing creates 
a shortage of capital and pushes up interest rates. 
V. APPENDIX A.  UNCLEAR DETAILS AND TPC’S 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE HOUSE GOP TAX PLAN 
Although Speaker Ryan released a “blueprint” that describes 
many details about the House GOP tax plan, that document lacks some 
important details necessary to score the plan accurately.  TPC sent the 
Speaker’s staff two sets of clarifying questions along with TPC’s 
working assumptions, one set on June 30, 2016, and a second on July 
7, 2016.  These are listed below.  We based our assumptions on the 
Tax document released by the Speaker.  The Speaker’s staff was not 
able to provide the clarifications we requested, indicating these 
represented issues that Members had not yet resolved.  However, they 
did point out that the blueprint intends that the ultimate plan be revenue 
neutral (after including macroeconomic feedback effects) and not raise 
average taxes on any income group.  Some key parameters, therefore, 
will have to change (assuming the Joint Committee on Taxation’s 
analysis is similar to ours), but we cannot anticipate exactly how 
                                                      
31 This is typically referred to as a “small open economy” model, where a 
nation’s capital market activity is inconsequential to world markets.  It is probably 
not appropriate for the U.S. given how large we are relative to the world economy, 
but is shown as a point of comparison. 




without further guidance.  If we receive clarifications in the future, we 
will update our analysis.   
A. Clarifying Questions and TPC’s Working Assumptions 
about Broad Provisions of the Plan (Sent to the 
Speaker’s Staff on June 30, 2016) 
1. “Special-Interest” Tax Provisions 
Q1. The Tax document indicates that the plan would repeal 
a number of “special-interest” exemptions, deductions 
and credits for individuals and deductions and credits 
for businesses, but only identifies one of those 
provisions (the section 199 domestic production 
deduction).  What, specifically, are these provisions? 
A1. TPC will assume the repealed provisions would 
include all of the tax expenditures listed at the end of 
this document.   
NOTE: We included in our revenue and distributional 
estimates only the repeal of those tax expenditures that were clearly 
identified in the blueprint released by the Speaker: the section 199 
domestic production deduction, employee fringe benefits (except those 
related to health and retirement), and all individual and business tax 
credits (except the child tax credit, the EITC, education credits, the 
saver’s credit, the research and experimentation tax credit, and the 
foreign tax credit, all of which the blueprint identifies as retained).  
Revenue estimates for the other provisions listed below are included 
as an addendum item in Table 2. 
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2. Transition Rules 
The document indicates that the Committee on Ways and 
Means will develop transition rules for the plan.  Because these rules 
could have a significant impact on scoring of the plan, key transition 
rules must be specified. 
Q2. Could unused depreciation and amortization on 
existing assets be used after the plan goes into effect, 
and if so what rules would apply? 
A2. TPC will assume that unused depreciation and 
amortization could be used under current law rules. 
Q3. Would the plan’s rules for disallowance of businesses’ 
net interest expense, with an indefinite carryforward 
(with interest), apply to debt outstanding when the 
rules go into effect? 
A3. TPC will assume that the plan’s rules would not apply, 
so that interest on existing debt would remain 
deductible without limit. 
Q4. Could unused credits repealed by the plan, including 
unused AMT credits, be used once the plan goes into 
effect, and if so what rules would apply? 
A4. TPC will assume that unused credits could be used, 
generally under current law rules. 
Q5. Would existing NOLs [net operating losses] be subject 
to the new rules under the plan? 
A5. TPC will assume that existing NOLs would be subject 
to the new rules. 
 
 
3. Border Adjustments 
The document indicates that the plan would move to a 
destination-basis tax system “by providing border adjustments 
exempting imports and taxing imports… within the context of the 
transformed business tax system”.32   
Q6. How would these border adjustments be made, and 
would any adjustment apply to direct imports by final 
consumers (households and governments)? 
                                                      
32 supra note 1 at 27.   




A6. TPC will assume that businesses would simply 
exclude receipts from exports and not deduct imported 
purchases, and that an excise tax of 20 percent (the 
corporate rate) would apply to direct imports by final 
consumers. 
4. Estate and Gift Taxes 
The plan would repeal the estate and generation-skipping 
transfer taxes.  The plan does not indicate whether the gift tax would 
also be repealed, or how the basis of gifts and inheritances received 
would be determined. 
Q7. Would the plan also repeal the gift tax? 
A7. TPC will assume that the gift tax is repealed. 
Q8. Would the basis of gifts and inheritances received a) 
be carried over from the donor, b) stepped up to their 
current market value, or c) treated differently? If basis 
is stepped up, would there be any limits on the amount 
stepped up? 
A8. TPC will assume that inter vivos gifts will continue to 
have carryover basis and that inheritances will receive 
stepped-up basis, but with the limits in effect in 2010 
($1.3 million plus an additional $3 million for 
surviving spouses, with any additional unrealized 
gains carried over) but indexed for inflation from 
2010. 
B. TPC Assumptions (Absent Clarifications) about Other 
Provisions 
1. Individual Income Tax 
1. All current law filing statuses would be retained. 
2. Individual income tax brackets would match current law (e.g., the 
plan’s 12 percent bracket ends at the same level as the current law 
15 percent bracket for each filing status). 
3. The 50 percent deduction for dividends would apply only to 
“qualified dividends” as defined under current law. 
4. Interest received from a pass-through would be reduced by interest 
paid by the pass-through (but not below zero) before applying the 
50 percent deduction. 
5. The limit on current deductibility of capital losses would be 
retained, but reduced from $3,000 to $1,500. 
6. The limitation on itemized deductions (Pease) would be repealed. 
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7. The new credit for non-child dependents would phase out under 
the same (revised) rules used to phase out the child tax credit. 
2. Business Tax Provisions 
8. Adequate definitions and safeguards would be included in the plan 
to guide (and enforce) the “reasonable compensation” requirement 
for sole proprietors and pass-through businesses. 
9. The 25 percent rate cap on the active business income of sole 
proprietors and pass-through businesses would be computed much 
like the current rate cap on capital gains and dividends (i.e., with 
active business income treated as otherwise taxable at the highest 
rate(s) applicable to the taxpayer). 
10. The interest rate that applies to carryforwards of unused NOLs 
would be the 10-year Treasury rate. 
11. The foreign tax credit allowed against the deemed repatriation of 
accumulated untaxed earnings and profits of foreign subsidiaries 
(as of the effective date of the plan) would be scaled down by the 
same ratio as the applicable rate (8.75 percent or 3.5 percent) to 35 
percent. 
3. Effective Date 
12. All provisions would become effective January 1, 2017. 
C. Provisions that TPC Will Assume are Unchanged 
The Tax document identifies a number of current law 
provisions that the plan leaves to the Committee on Ways and Means 
to examine with the goal of reforming them.  Because the document 
proposes no specific reforms of the following provisions, TPC must 
assume for its analysis that the current law specification of the 
following provisions would remain unchanged.  However, we’d be 
happy to model the specific reforms if you can provide details. 
• Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
• Education incentives 
• Employer-provided health insurance benefits, including FSAs 
and HSAs [flexible spending accounts and health savings 
accounts] 
• Employer-provided retirement benefits 
• Other saving incentives (including both retirement-related and 
other saving incentives) 
• Mortgage interest deduction 
• Charitable contribution deduction 




• Foreign earned income exclusion and other special rules for 
individuals living abroad 
• Deductibility of interest paid by financial services businesses 
• Research and experimentation (R&E) credit 
D. Health-Related Tax Provisions 
The document only partially addresses reform of health-related 
tax provisions.  The plan would repeal all itemized deductions other 
than those for mortgage interest and charitable contributions, but does 
not specifically list the deduction for medical and dental expenses.  
The plan also assumes that all of the taxes enacted as part of the ACA 
would be repealed and not replaced with other taxes.  However, repeal 
of these taxes is not considered part of the plan, but rather part of a 
separate proposal of the Health Care Task Force.  The plan description 
includes no other health-related tax provisions.  The report of the 
Health Care Task Force33 indicates other health-related tax changes 
that would be made (e.g., a cap on the exclusion for employer-provided 
health benefits), but does not provide specifications that would allow 
scoring them. 
In order to make its analysis consistent with the health-related 
tax changes that are specified in the plan and related plans, TPC will 
assume that the itemized deduction for medical and dental expenses 
would be repealed, along with all of the ACA taxes including the 3.8 
percent net investment income tax, the 0.9 percent additional Medicare 
rate, excise taxes (e.g., on medical devices and high premium health 
insurance), and related fees.  Note that the premium credit is treated as 
an outlay, rather than a tax, by CBO, so we do not include it among 
the repealed ACA taxes. 
E. “Special-Interest” Tax Provisions 
The following is the list of tax expenditures (including related 
payroll tax expenditures) that TPC assumes are repealed by the plan.  
Please let us know if any of these items would be retained under the 
proposal. 
1. Corporate Income Tax 
Energy credit (section 48): Solar 
Energy credit (section 48): Geothermal 
Coal production credit: Refined coal 
Coal production credit: Indian coal 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, fuels: Oil and gas 
                                                      
33 supra note 1. 
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Excess of percentage over cost depletion, fuels: Other fuels 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, nonfuel minerals 
Special rules for mining reclamation reserves 
Special tax rate for nuclear decommissioning reserve funds 
Exclusion of contributions in aid of construction for water and sewer 
utilities 
Exclusion of earnings of certain environmental settlement funds 
Exclusion of cost-sharing payments 
Credit for low-income housing  
Credit for rehabilitation of historic structures 
Credit for rehabilitation of structures, other than historic structures 
Deferral of gain on non-dealer installment sales  
Deferral of gain on like-kind exchanges 
Exemptions from imputed interest rules 
Completed contract rules 
Credit for employer-paid FICA taxes on tips 
Deduction for income attributable to domestic production activities 
Credit for the cost of carrying tax-paid distilled spirits in wholesale 
inventories 
Exclusion of gain or loss on sale or exchange of brownfield property 
Income recognition rule for gain or loss from section 1256 contracts 
Exemption of credit union income 
Small life insurance company taxable income adjustment 
Special treatment of life insurance company reserves 
Special deduction for Blue Cross and Blue Shield companies 
Tax-exempt status and election to be taxed only on investment income 
for certain small property and casualty insurance companies 
Interest rate and discounting period assumptions for reserves of 
property and casualty insurance companies 
Proration for property and casualty insurance companies 
Deferral of tax on capital construction funds of shipping companies 
Special tax provisions for employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 
Deferral of taxation on spread on acquisition of stock under incentive 
stock option plans 
Deferral of taxation on spread on employee stock purchase plans 
Disallowance of deduction for excess parachute payments  




Limits on deductible compensation  
Credit for employer-provided dependent care 
Credit for disabled access expenditures 
Credit for orphan drug research 
Tax credit for small businesses purchasing employer insurance 
Exclusion of disaster mitigation payments 
 
Tax Expenditures permanently extended by HR 2029: 
Modification of tax treatment of certain payments under existing 
arrangements to controlling exempt organizations made permanent 
Permanently extend and modify employer wage credit for activated 
military reservists 
Minimum LIHTC rate for non-Federally subsidized new buildings 
(9%) made permanent 
2. Individual Income Tax (including pass-through 
businesses) 
Exclusion of benefits and allowances to armed forces personnel 
Exclusion of military disability benefits 
Deduction for overnight-travel expenses of national guard and reserve 
members 
Exclusion of energy conservation subsidies provided by public utilities 
Energy credit (section 48): Solar 
Energy credit (section 48): Geothermal 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, fuels: Oil and gas 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, fuels: Other fuels 
Exceptions for publicly traded partnership with qualified income 
derived from certain energy-related activities 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion, nonfuel minerals 
Special rules for mining reclamation reserves 
Special tax rate for qualified timber gain (including coal and iron ore) 
Treatment of income from exploration and mining of natural resources 
as qualifying income under the publicly-traded partnership rules 
Exclusion of cost-sharing payments 
Exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness income of farmers 
Income averaging for farmers and fishermen 
Exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences 
Credit for low-income housing  
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Credit for rehabilitation of historic structures 
Credit for rehabilitation of structures, other than historic structures 
Deferral of gain on non-dealer installment sales  
Deferral of gain on like-kind exchanges 
Exemptions from imputed interest rules 
Completed contract rules 
Credit for employer-paid FICA taxes on tips 
Deduction for income attributable to domestic production activities 
Exclusion for gain from certain small business stock 
Income recognition rule for gain or loss from section 1256 contracts 
Exclusion of employer-paid transportation benefits (parking, van 
pools, and transit passes) 
Exclusion of employee meals and lodging (other than military) 
Exclusion of housing allowances for ministers 
Exclusion of miscellaneous fringe benefits 
Exclusion of employee awards 
Exclusion of income earned by voluntary employees' beneficiary 
associations 
Special tax provisions for employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 
Deferral of taxation on spread on acquisition of stock under incentive 
stock option plans 
Deferral of taxation on spread on employee stock purchase plans 
Credit for employer-provided dependent care 
Exclusion of certain foster care payments 
Adoption credit and employee adoption benefits exclusion 
Credit for disabled access expenditures 
Credit for orphan drug research 
Tax credit for small businesses purchasing employer insurance 
Exclusion of workers' compensation benefits (disability and survivors 
payments) 
Exclusion of damages on account of personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness 
Exclusion of special benefits for disabled coal miners 
Premiums on group term life insurance 
Premiums on accident and disability insurance 




Exclusion of survivor annuities paid to families of public safety 
officers killed in the line of duty 
Exclusion of disaster mitigation payments 
Exclusion of veterans' readjustment benefits 
Deferral of interest on savings bonds 
 
Tax Expenditures permanently extended by HR 2029: 
Parity for exclusion from income for employer-provided mass transit 
and parking benefits made permanent  
Permanently extend and modify employer wage credit for activated 
military reservists 
Treatment of certain dividends of RICs made permanent 
Exclusion of 100 percent of gain on certain small business stock made 
permanent 
Reduction in S corporation recognition period for built-in gains tax 
made permanent 
Minimum LIHTC rate for non-Federally subsidized new buildings 
(9%) made permanent 
Military housing allowance exclusion for determining LIHTC 
eligibility made permanent 
Treatment of RICs as "qualified investment entities" under section 897 
(FIRPTA) made permanent 
Deductibility of excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health 
coverage  
3. Payroll Tax 
Exclusion of employer-paid transportation benefits (parking, van 
pools, and transit passes) 
Exclusion of employee meals and lodging (other than military) 
Exclusion of housing allowances for ministers 
Exclusion of other employee benefits: Premiums on group term life 
insurance (excludes payroll taxes) 
Exclusion of other employee benefits: Premiums on accident and 
disability insurance 
 
Tax Expenditure permanently extended by HR 2029: 
Parity for exclusion from income for employer-provided mass transit 
and parking benefits made permanent  
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F. Additional Clarifying Questions and TPC Assumptions 
about the Plan (Sent to the Speaker’s Staff July 7, 2016) 
1. “Special Interest” Tax Provisions 
In addition to the list of tax expenditures listed in our prior 
document, we will also assume repeal of all private purpose tax exempt 
bonds; repeal of above-the-line deductions for expenses of educators 
and reservists, etc., moving expenses and alimony paid; and repeal of 
all personal credits (except the child tax credit, education credits, 
saver’s credit, and the foreign tax credit; so, for example, we will 
assume the child and dependent care tax credit is repealed). 
NOTE: We included in our revenue and distributional 
estimates only the repeal of those tax expenditures that were clearly 
identified in the blueprint released by the Speaker: the section 199 
domestic production deduction, employee fringe benefits (except those 
related to health and retirement), and all individual and business tax 
credits (except the child tax credit, the EITC, education credits, the 
saver’s credit, the research and experimentation tax credit, and the 
foreign tax credit, all of which the blueprint identifies as retained).  
Revenue estimates for the other provisions listed above are included 
as an addendum item in Table 2. 
2. Rate Cap on Active Business Income 
We will assume that income currently subject to SECA, or 
taxed as wages of worker/owners of subchapter S corporations, is 
“reasonable compensation”.  For the remaining income of sole 
proprietors and pass-through businesses, we will assume that only 
income that is currently not considered “passive” will qualify for the 
rate cap.  Current active business losses will be allowed, rather than 
being carried forward with interest (which will shift the timing of 
income tax receipts somewhat, but generally not the present value of 
these receipts). 
3. Child Tax Credit and New Credit for Other 
Dependents 
We will assume these are not indexed for inflation. 
4. Standard Deduction for Dependents 
We will assume that the standard deduction for dependents (in 
2016 dollars) is the smaller of: (i) the greater of (a) earned income plus 
$350 and (b) $1,050, and (ii) the regular standard deduction for the 
dependent’s filing status (as modified by the proposal).  We will 
assume all amounts are indexed for inflation. 
 




5. Base Year for Indexing 
We will assume that all indexed parameters are stated at 2016 
levels, so are indexed beginning in 2017 (our assumed effective date 
for the plan). 
VI. APPENDIX B.  MEASURING DISTRIBUTIONAL 
EFFECTS OF TAX CHANGES 
Analysts use a variety of measures to assess the distributional 
effects of tax changes.  There is no perfect measure—often a 
combination of measures is more informative than any single measure.   
The Tax Policy Center generally focuses on the percentage 
change in after-tax income because it measures the gain or loss of 
income available to households to buy goods and services, relative to 
the amount available before the tax change.  A tax change that raises 
or lowers after-tax income by the same percentage for all households 
leaves the progressivity of the tax unchanged.   
Other measures used to assess a tax change’s effects include 
shares of the tax cut going to different parts of the income distribution, 
the size of each group’s cut measured in dollars, and the percentage 
change in tax liability.  The first two measures poorly indicate the 
effects of a tax change because they ignore the initial distribution of 
taxes and thus do not assess changes in a tax’s progressivity.  The 
percentage change in tax liability can be particularly misleading 
because it relies too much on the initial distribution of taxes.  Cutting 
the tax on a person making $1,000 from $50 to $10 is an 80 percent 
cut, whereas reducing taxes on a person making $1 million from 
$250,000 to $150,000 is just a 40 percent cut.  But the tax savings 
boosts after-tax income by only about 4 percent for the poorer person, 
compared with a more than 13 percent increase for the higher-income 
person.   
294 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:257 
 
 
Table B1 shows several different measures of the effects of the 
House GOP tax plan on households at different income levels in 2017.  
The tax cut is most significant as a share of after-tax income (column 
1) for those with high incomes, as discussed above.  It’s also true that 
for this plan, high-income people get the bulk of the tax cuts (column 
2), that the average tax change is highest at high income levels (column 
3), and that the tax cut is a larger share of tax liability for high-income 
households (column 4).  Finally, the share of federal tax burdens 
increases at most income levels, falling only for the top 1 percent 
(column 5). 
